The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications


Free download. Book file PDF easily for everyone and every device. You can download and read online The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications file PDF Book only if you are registered here. And also you can download or read online all Book PDF file that related with The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications book. Happy reading The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications Bookeveryone. Download file Free Book PDF The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications at Complete PDF Library. This Book have some digital formats such us :paperbook, ebook, kindle, epub, fb2 and another formats. Here is The CompletePDF Book Library. It's free to register here to get Book file PDF The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications Pocket Guide.
Research Interests

This is aimed at the "detection, issue of target designation, and delivery of selective strikes against critically important targets in near-real time by strategic and operational-tactical non-nuclear weapons. Subsequently, military science needs to develop and substantiate a system for comprehensive engagement of the enemy.

Gerasimov stressed the importance of a number of issues for military science to develop: "digital technologies, robotics, unmanned systems, and electronic warfare" Krasnaya Zvezda , March 4.

Russia 2019+ Military Doctrine

It also focused on modernization of Russian military capability with priority for nuclear and pre-nuclear deterrence. His remarks reflected growing confidence in the General Staff about the use of military power, political-military coercion and thinking about developing strategies to counter a high-technology adversary. Roger N. De Oppresso Liber,. David Maxwell. Senior Fellow.

Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Twitter: davidmaxwell FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. If you do not read anything else in the National Security Strategy read this on page An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought.

Problems, Challenges, & Policy Implications

Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. The various parts included: command, control, communications, and computers C4 ; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ISR ; long range, precision strike; and stealth technology. Russian economic performance improved in the first decade of the twenty-first century relative to the miserable disaster of the s, mostly due to oil prices but also on account of a widespread perception of stronger state leadership.

As for the reforms undertaken by Serdyukov, they were ambitious but lacked a clear objective and adequate resources, and in addition, were met with resistance at almost every turn Further, most of the troops are conscripts serving one year terms and called up twice each year: at any given time, half of them have been in uniform less than six months and lack adequate training for battle.

Shortcomings in the ground forces are not the end of the story. According to expert analyst and commentator Pavel Felgenhauer:. The United States and NATO continued to be the presumed main enemy; and the Defense Ministry made massive investments into new strategic nuclear weapons and air defenses. At the same time, attempts to meet all other possible threats resulted in thinly spreading out limited resources. Major military reform decisions have never been openly discussed in parliament or in the expert community. The cloak of almost total secrecy has led to costly mistakes and massive criminal misappropriations of resources.

In addition, future warfare will take place in at least five dimensions: land; sea; air; space; and cyberspace. The possibility of strategic losses within minutes or seconds in the opening phase of war, including a possible cyberwar that would create chaos with exclusively electronic casualties, is now within the reach of feasible or foreseeable military art. As Dale R. Herspring has warned, notwithstanding the progress already made in reform and the seriousness of Serdyukov and former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev:.

If it does not deal with these issues, Russia will face the probability of repeating its horrible performance in the war with Georgia. Only the next time, the consequences could be far worse. Russia rushed in at the endgame to make a dramatic gesture of deploying its share of the peacekeeping force into Kosovo. Three immediate implications for Russian military planners suggest themselves. Tactical flexibility will be a necessary condition for the accomplishment of battlefield objectives that would otherwise remain at risk.

Soviet operations in the Great Patriotic War were designed for a command and control system that maximized the flexibility of operational and strategic commanders, at the expense of very restrictive guidelines for tactical commanders in the Soviet ground forces, division or lower. Third, offensive and defensive information warfare, including both information-supported military operations and information-based psychological warfare against enemy societies, moves to the head of the lecture circuit among topics in the armed forces general staff syllabus.

Russia has now seen the United States fight four wars or multinational peace operations based more or less on information superiority: Operation Desert Storm in ; Kosovo in ; Afghanistan in ; and Iraq, in Although armed forces are frequently studied from the perspectives of their military doctrine or combat tactics, they are less frequently analyzed as holistic institutions subject to periods of institutional steadiness or stress.

Beyond a certain point, incremental adaptation to a radically different environment is no longer possible: the organization must change its institutional ethos or cease to function with the same set of role perceptions. It can continue as an organization but not as the same institution it once was. In the judgment of some leading post-Soviet Russian commanders, Russia had no option but to adapt to this information-based military template:.

Moreover, the primary targets in the course of the conflict were clearly specified: key installations of the economic infrastructure, elements of the state and military command and control system, and lines of transportation. The diffusion of the appropriate portable and desktop workstations and information bases throughout the Russian armed forces chain of command must certainly affect everything else that armed forces do.

There is a curvilinear relationship between the ability of communications and electronics technology to augment combat effectiveness and the eventual and additional vulnerability that this technology establishes, once forces have become dependent on it. A particular concern for the Russian armed forces would be the danger of having tactical units isolated and cut off from one another. Such an outcome is not inconceivable to Soviet military planners; it happened to them in the week following 22 June The U. The first side to lose its command, control and communications may also lose its combat stability and thus, its ability to fight a war with small unit cohesion and combat system interdependence.

Navigation menu

If, for example, the tactical air or air defense component of a modern ground force can be electronically isolated from the remainder of the force, then the remnants of that force can be swallowed up at the discretion of the opponent. Future generations of war-winning strategies below the threshold of nuclear escalation may have to rely on the 'implosion' of the opponent's command and control system and the subsequent collapse of the opponent's ability to coordinate the use of formations of various sizes and composition.

However, Russian military planners might reasonably assume that the initial period of war can be one of great danger. What seems politically absurd in a day and age of U. Russian and Soviet historical experience so dictates. As the authoritative strategic assessment group Stratfor noted in April, The Russians can conceive of it. They remember that Germany in was crippled. By it was overwhelmingly powerful. Six years is not very long, and while such an evolution is unlikely now, from the Russian point of view, it must be taken seriously in the long run — planning for the worst and hoping for the best.

Russian intelligence will place equally high importance on the detection of enemy political decision to attack strategic warning as on the acquisition of order-of-battle data and other information essential for response to tactical warning.

Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform | Crisis Group

In this regard, the U. Reaching agreement on the reduction or elimination of European non-strategic nuclear weapons may present both domestic and foreign policy difficulties. The Russian government attitude toward TNW appears to represent a complex mix of domestic and bureaucratic politics, mis perceptions, and idiosyncrasies. Russia is threatened neither primarily nor immediately by NATO. Preparedness for these contingencies of limited and local wars, regular and irregular, will require a smaller, more professional and more mobile military than post-Soviet Russia has fielded hitherto As Lilia Shevtsova has explained, the primary objective of the Russian system domestically is to preserve the monopoly of power held by the ruling elite.

As she explains, Russian foreign and security policies have to pursue apparently contradictory paths:. Of course, whether domestic or international influences act as independent or interdependent variables is highly situational. Grateful acknowledgment is made to Stephen J.

My Wishlist

Blank, David M. Glantz, Dale R.


  • The Reform of Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces.
  • You are being redirected.
  • Affiliated Senior Analyst, Danish Institute for International Studies.
  • Additional information.

Kipp, and Timothy L. Thomas for insights into this topic, and appreciation is also extended to Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski for editorial suggestions. They bear no responsibility for any arguments or opinions stated hererin. Ivanov, Nachal'nyi period voiny: po opytu pervykh kampanii I operatsii vtoroi mirovoi voiny , Moscow: Voenizdat, Rostunov Ed. I, Moscow: Nauka, , Ch. See, for example Lt. See also A. Grechko, et. For an appraisal of Soviet threat assessment between the two world wars, see J.

May Ed.


  • Publications;
  • The Making of Tibias Ivory: Freedoms Quest.
  • Von der Raupe zum Schmetterling: Mit Affirmationen Selbstentwicklung erfahren (German Edition)!
  • Das Liebeskonzil (German Edition).
  • Affiliated Senior Analyst, Danish Institute for International Studies?
  • A Bible Study of Proverbs Chapter 2--Book 1!
  • Roger McDermott | European Leadership Network;

Beyond a certain point, incremental adaptation to a radically different environment is no longer possible: the organization must change its institutional ethos or cease to function with the same set of role perceptions. It can continue as an organization but not as the same institution it once was. In the judgment of some leading post-Soviet Russian commanders, Russia had no option but to adapt to this information-based military template:. Moreover, the primary targets in the course of the conflict were clearly specified: key installations of the economic infrastructure, elements of the state and military command and control system, and lines of transportation.

The diffusion of the appropriate portable and desktop workstations and information bases throughout the Russian armed forces chain of command must certainly affect everything else that armed forces do. There is a curvilinear relationship between the ability of communications and electronics technology to augment combat effectiveness and the eventual and additional vulnerability that this technology establishes, once forces have become dependent on it.

A particular concern for the Russian armed forces would be the danger of having tactical units isolated and cut off from one another. Such an outcome is not inconceivable to Soviet military planners; it happened to them in the week following 22 June The U.

Nuclear weapons, financing, and Russia’s armed forces reform

The first side to lose its command, control and communications may also lose its combat stability and thus, its ability to fight a war with small unit cohesion and combat system interdependence. If, for example, the tactical air or air defense component of a modern ground force can be electronically isolated from the remainder of the force, then the remnants of that force can be swallowed up at the discretion of the opponent.

Future generations of war-winning strategies below the threshold of nuclear escalation may have to rely on the 'implosion' of the opponent's command and control system and the subsequent collapse of the opponent's ability to coordinate the use of formations of various sizes and composition.

However, Russian military planners might reasonably assume that the initial period of war can be one of great danger. What seems politically absurd in a day and age of U. Russian and Soviet historical experience so dictates.

The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications
The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications
The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications
The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications
The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications
The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications
The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications

Related The Reform Of Russias Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges & Policy Implications



Copyright 2019 - All Right Reserved